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Abstract  
This study purpose is to verify if there is an association between foreign immigration 
and crime. In doing this, the study investigates also some satellite aspects revolving 
around this possible association: the range of offences affected by immigration, the 
relationship between immigrant and native crime, and whether the immigration impact 
on crime is direct or indirect. The present study has addressed these issues by both a 
cross-sectional and a longitudinal analysis, the latter including an instrument. The study 
is based on data of the Italian provinces. Italy represents a critical case for studying the 
migration-crime relationship, because in this country the rise in foreign immigration 
has been sudden and its pace feverish. The cross-sectional analysis findings show that 
crime intensities are affected by time-invariant factors and marginally by immigration. 
On the contrary, the longitudinal analysis shows that variations in immigration had a 
positive impact on both the most serious and the most common offences, on property 
crimes as well as on crimes of violence. There is no evidence of indirect effects of 
immigration on crime or of a link with native crime. In contrast to previous literature 
regarding the U.S., Canada, and Australia, these results suggest that a spiralling 
immigration can affect crime. In terms of methods, these findings show that the 
standard synchronic analysis models can be biased by non-observed factors and that 
therefore cross-sectional time-series models can offer significant advantages.  
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Immigration, Socio-Economic Conditions and Crime: 
A Cross-Sectional vs. Cross-Sectional Time-Series Perspective 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, studies conducted in most Western European countries have found 
immigrant crime figures markedly higher than those observed in the national population 
(Andersson 1984; Junger-Tas 1985; Natale 1988; Junger 1989; Tournier and Robert 
1989; Albrecht 1993; Hebberecht 1997; Killias 1997; Lagrange 2010; O’Nolan 2011; 
Leerkes, Engbersen and van der Leun 2012). These results were unexpected, because 
studies conducted during the 1950s and 1960s in Europe’s large-scale immigration 
countries – Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium and England – had found that 
immigrant crime rates were inferior or similar to native rates (on the entire subject, 
Marshall 1997; Tonry 1997; Solivetti 2010). Moreover, studies conducted outside 
Europe have denied higher crime rates among immigrants: results obtained in larger 
immigration countries, such as Canada, the United States and Australia, seem to agree 
in confirming this picture (Yeager 1996; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007; Francis 2014; see 
also p. 8).  
Unsurprisingly, the immigration-crime link has fuelled a most heated debate in 
Western Europe. Political parties have been at daggers drawn over immigration policies 
and control of immigrant crime, and these issues are at the top of the agenda of new 
nationalistic political organizations. Even social scientists present standpoints often in 
sharp conflict with each other. 
Blinded Manuscript
2 
 
Certainly, Western Europe’s immigration is peculiar and few people are aware of 
its magnitude. In the 1990s, 1.65 million immigrants per year reached Western Europe; 
from 2001, about 2 million (OECD 2015). In the same period, the United States – the 
land of immigration – received an inflow of about 1 million per year. This rather 
uniform flow towards the U.S. since the 1990s has also been the outcome of stricter 
controls, which in turn have increased the migratory pressure on Europe. 
Within Europe, Italy represents an ideal critical case for studying the migration-
crime link. A net emigration country until the 1960s, Italy had a foreign population of 
only 0.4% in 1981. Since the early 1990s, however, there has been a massive spike in 
immigrant flows. The years 1995-2005 were crucial: the immigrant share rose in that 
period from 1.8% to 4.7% of the resident population. This despite the country’s high 
unemployment (on average 10.3%) and its high Gini’s (34.5) exacerbated by its poor 
score in economic freedom (64.9 compared to the UK’s 79.2: Gwartney, Lawson and 
Hall 2013). These aspects inevitably dampen immigrants’ vocational integration and 
upward mobility (Calavita 2005). Only a fraction of immigrants (16% in 2000) were 
from Western Europe or North America, Australia, Japan etc., and most others – usually 
low-skilled workers – from culturally remote, relatively less-developed countries: which 
is considered detrimental to assimilation/integration (Karstedt 2001; Junger-Tas 2001; 
Albrecht 2002; Reich 2006). The inflow from less-developed countries included a 
substantial number of illegal immigrants – cyclically reabsorbed by ad hoc 
regularizations – whose condition is considered critical for crime control (Leerkes, 
Engbersen and van der Leun 2012). Such a migratory flow has mainly concerned the 
Central and Northern regions, where immigrants during this period were 3.3 times their 
3 
 
number in the Southern region. The latter, in turn, is comparatively less industrialized, 
underdeveloped, and – as the “South” in the U.S. – with a much higher homicide rate. 
The Southern region is also well known for the long presence of criminal organizations 
rooted in the local context (Mafia, Camorra etc.).  
Such migratory features and background make it worthwhile studying the 
immigration impact on crime in Italy. The Italian case could provide an answer to a 
couple of questions. Is the impact on crime larger in countries where the immigration 
growth has been feverish? Especially where there is a long-established form of 
organized crime, is immigrant crime the offshoot of native crime? 
Regrettably, current literature has provided inconsistent answers to the migration-
crime link, though the main theories expect immigrants to have high crime rates. 
Some authors have adopted the anomie conceptual framework and Merton’s 
hypothesis (1949) that high social pressure to succeed materially in the face of scarce 
legitimate opportunities leads to crime and other forms of deviance. Immigrants – who 
on average present lower education, higher unemployment and lower wages – are short 
of legitimate opportunities, whereas their pressure to succeed is high, since it was to 
better their status that they became immigrants. Therefore, they would be on average 
prone to crime (Basdevant 1983; Killias 1989; von Hofer, Sarnecki and Tham 1997; 
Albrecht 1997; Aoki and Todo 2009; Bovenkerk and Fokkema 2016). Other authors 
have supported the so-called economic model of crime, which, following Becker’s 
pioneering study (1968), assumes that crime is a rational option whenever its benefit 
outweighs its cost. Crime costs and benefits, in turn, are influenced by economic 
conditions, which affect both legitimate opportunities (supply) and returns to crime 
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(demand). Therefore – for reasons abovementioned, i.e. shortage of legitimate 
opportunities – the average propensity for crime among immigrants should be higher 
(Neumayer 2006; Vaillant and Dervaux 2008; Bell, Machin and Fasani 2010; Spenkuch 
2014). Both the anomie and the economic approach to crime posit an association 
between immigration and utilitarian crimes, though an association also with non-
utilitarian crimes – mediated by frustration – has been hypothesized regarding anomie 
(Blau and Blau 1982; Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008). It should be noticed that most 
studies using these theories to explain immigrant crime come from Europe. Faced with a 
scenario of relatively low immigrant crime, most American authors emphasize, 
conversely, the immigrant paradox: the fact that immigrants’ economic disadvantage 
does not translate into the expected high rates of deviance and crime (Sampson 2008; 
Stowell et al. 2009; Vaughn et al. 2014). This surprising outcome is usually ascribed to 
the immigrants’ stronger family ties and ethnic social relations (Zhou and Bankston 
1998), though the hypothesis that immigrants are less crime-prone out of fear of being 
"noticed" by the authorities is not ruled out (Ousey and Kubrin 2009). Because of this 
paradox, immigration inflows would lower local crime rates. 
Immigrant crime could be associated with something other than socio-economic 
status. First, social disorganization theory, a product of the Chicago School of 
Sociology, regarded immigrant crime as an ecological problem: the consequence of the 
lack of cohesion and social control generated by the residential mobility and ethnic 
heterogeneity due to large-scale immigration. This model – near and dear to American 
authors – has been used in studies carried out also in other countries (Sampson and 
Groves 1989; Haynie and South 2005; Herzog 2009; Boggess and Hipp 2010). Because 
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immigration inevitably produces residential instability, usually these two aspects are 
deemed synonymous: however, it is important to ascertain whether crime derives from 
instability in itself or from the immigration behind it. To do so, we would have to verify 
whether instability not associated with foreign immigration has any effect on crime. Nor 
should we ignore that other studies contended that residential stability and ethnic 
homogeneity, when accompanied with concentrated disadvantage, would produce high 
crime levels (Sampson and Wilson 1995; Hipp 2010). 
Second, any immigration-crime association could be the indirect effect of 
immigration. Foreign workers are expected to reduce natives’ job opportunities, making 
less-skilled natives redundant and/or lowering their wages: which in turn would increase 
native propensity for crime. Therefore, the ascription of crime to immigrants could be a 
case of confusion between ecological and individual correlations. Empirical evidence 
supporting this hypothesis is scarce (Butcher and Piehl 1998; von Hofer and Tham 
2000; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010); and the results regarding the immigration impact 
on native unemployment are contradictory (Card 2001; Borjas 2003). The issue is 
complicated further by the fact that immigrant inflows could generate native internal 
migration (Borjas 2003), which in turn would alter local unemployment levels.  
Third, the differential association theory denied any immigrant penchant for crime. 
It regarded first-generation immigrants as less criminal than natives and explained the 
higher crime rate among second-generation immigrants as the result of their absorbing 
from native delinquents the attitudes and skills necessary to enter the criminal world 
(Sutherland 1924). This process would occur particularly where organized crime is a 
time-honoured tradition (Landesco 1968). Criticized for being too generic, this theory 
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was revised as differential association-reinforcement (Burgess and Akers 1966) and as 
such used to explain delinquency in newcomers and second-generation immigrants 
(Haynie and South 2005; Dipietro and McGloin 2012). It is worth trying to investigate 
this aspect and particularly whether new immigrant crime is an offshoot of past native 
crime. However, this subject is intertwined with that of immigrant location: 
consequently, various scenarios are possible. 1. Immigrants settle in high-crime 
territorial units; local crime rates decrease; cross-sectional differences in crime rates 
decrease. 2. Immigrants settle in high-crime territorial units; crime rates increase; cross-
sectional differences increase. 3. Immigrants settle in low-crime territorial units; crime 
rates decrease; cross-sectional differences increase. 4. Immigrants settle in low-crime 
territorial units; crime rates increase; cross-sectional differences decrease. The first 
scenario is close to the original formulation of the theory, provided there is an increase 
in crime later with the second generation. The increase in crime across time and 
immigrant generations found support in a few studies in Europe (Killias 1989; 
Bovenkerk and Fokkema 2016) and in several U.S. studies (Zhou and Bankston 1998; 
Rumbaut and Ewing 2007; Hagan, Levi and Dinovitzer 2008). However many other 
U.S. studies (Sampson 2008; Stowell et al. 2009; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Martinez, 
Stowell and Lee 2010; MacDonald, Hipp and Gill 2013) supported the abovementioned, 
more generic hypothesis of a decrease in crime concomitant with the immigration 
inflow. The differential association theory is ill suited to the second scenario, because 
the process of going-native, criminally speaking, requires time; it is even less suited to 
the fourth one, where the original crime rate is low but rises with immigration.  
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The theories mentioned above have led to both micro and macro research. The 
macro approach best serves the analysis of the immigration-crime link, not least because 
the diminutive clearance rate characterizing crime all over the world hinders a reliable 
association between total crime and individuals. Moreover, the macro approach permits 
supra-individual factors to be taken into account. A macro analysis across the territorial 
units could ascertain whether the immigration-crime link is confirmed territorially and 
whether there are local determinants of crime more momentous than immigration. On 
the other hand, cross-sectional territorial studies are good at identifying the event 
densities, but they miss their variations. And crime densities could also derive from 
time-invariant, non-observed factors, rather than from immigration. This is more likely 
wherever there are territorial differences in cultural and socio-economic conditions. A 
fixed-effects longitudinal analysis, being based on variations over time in the territorial 
units, would bypass the effects on crime of these persistent factors and would identify 
the effects of change. Second, longitudinal analyses reckon both the association 
between events and their temporal order. Therefore, they help distinguish between 
correlation and causality. 
Ultimately, cross-sectional time-series analyses offer advantages over other 
methods, though these advantages are offset by drawbacks: it is difficult to find data for 
the same variables over time; some data are gathered infrequently, e.g. only during 
censuses; data collection procedures can differ locally. Therefore, cross-sectional time-
series studies are time-consuming, expensive, and can exploit fewer variables. 
Unsurprisingly, immigration and crime studies of this type are rare.  
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Butcher and Piehl (1998) carried out a study on 43 metropolitan areas of the U.S. 
They found that high-crime areas were also characterized by higher immigrant shares, 
since immigrants settled mainly in those areas. However, when variations over time 
were considered, immigrant share changes were not associated with changes either in 
violent crime or in overall crime.  
Ousey and Kubrin (2009) analysed the immigration-crime link as to U.S. towns. 
They found that violent crime variations were negatively correlated with the recent 
foreign-born share, and instead directly correlated with variations in family instability, 
residential instability and illegal drugs diffusion. Property crime rates, too, were 
negatively associated with immigration and directly with drug diffusion. Stowell et al. 
(2009), examining violent crime in the U.S. metropolitan areas between 1994 and 2004, 
found foreign-born share changes inversely associated with crime changes. Martinez, 
Stowell and Lee (2010) focused on smaller territorial units (San Diego’s urban 
sections), where they found that homicide variations were directly associated with 
relative deprivation but inversely with the foreign born. 
Spenkuch’s findings (2014) diverge from the previous ones. He analysed panel data 
based on U.S. counties in the period 1980-2000 and distinguished the foreign born 
according to their origin, finding that immigration had a significant effect on property 
crimes but none on “crimes of passion”, such as rape and aggravated assault. Besides, 
Spenkuch found that the presence of Mexican immigrants – on average less vocationally 
integrated – had an impact on property crime. The author regarded this finding as 
consistent with the economic theory of crime. 
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In Europe, a panel analysis of 11 German Länder (federal states) by Entorf and 
Spengler (2000) reached the conclusion that, when controlling for unemployment, 
income and juvenile population, variations in the foreign population had an impact on 
theft and overall crime, but not on violent crime.  
Later, Buonanno (2006), using Italian regional data, found that, when controlling 
for urbanization, unemployment and income, there was a weak association between 
foreign immigrants and property crime. Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti (2008), this time 
using Italian provincial data, found that variations in the immigrant share were 
associated with significant variations in the robbery rate. 
Ultimately, we can notice some unresolved topics in the existing literature. There is 
no leading theory on the immigration-crime link, and the different explanations offered 
by anomie, social disorganization and differential association are emblematic of this 
situation. Additionally, the validity of these hypotheses in contexts geographically far 
removed from those where they were developed is dubious. It is not even clear if the 
immigration-crime relationship in Western Europe has anything in common with that in 
Canada, Australia and the U.S. The aim of the present study is to ascertain whether the 
immigration-crime relationship can be direct, rather than negative or non-significant, as 
seems to be the rule in the latter countries. And if it were direct, we intend to identify its 
covariates, testing at least the main hypotheses deriving from the current literature.  
Organization of the study and data 
Sample 
The present analysis has been conducted on the 103 Italian provinces (pre-2001 
boundaries). Each territorial unit comprises on average 2,900 sq. km and 550,000 
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inhabitants (2001). Our strongly balanced panel contains four waves, corresponding to 
the years of spiralling immigration: 1995, 1998, 2002, and 2005. Data underlying the 
variables – crime data included – were drawn from Istat (Italy’s Institute of Statistics) 
databases.  
Measures: dependent, explanatory and instrumental variables 
Crime rates and their variations are our main dependent variables. Crime figures 
regard recorded criminal offences verified by the judiciary. We considered some of the 
most serious offences, namely completed intentional homicide, rape, robbery, extortion; 
then a less serious but more common offence against the person, i.e. grievous bodily 
harm; then the most common offence, theft; and, last, the total number of offences, i.e. 
the so-called criminality index (Table 1). The decomposition of crime into these 
offences was inspired also by considerations about the underreporting of some offences. 
Official data tend to underrate some immigrant crimes, since intra-ethnic common 
offences such as theft and bodily harm are underreported, especially by recent 
immigrants (Bell and Machin 2011), who represent a large share of the immigrant 
population in Italy. Underreporting occurs also with intra-ethnic extortion, but rarely 
with robbery, and practically never with intentional homicide. We did not consider other 
offences, such as transnational drug trafficking, human trafficking and exploitation of 
prostitution, because they are regarded as rather obviously associated with immigration 
in Europe (Salt 2000; Paoli and Reuter 2008). 
The main explanatory variables belong to the demographic domain and regard 
migration: all the adult foreign immigrants (MF, and M only), as well as the adult male 
immigrants belonging to the six national groups with the highest impact on crime, 
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which are all from non-Western, relatively less-developed countries.1 These groups 
were identified by their contribution to the Italian criminality index, not by their crime 
rate. Groups with the highest crime rates may be small and therefore may have a limited 
impact on crime figures. The immigration indicators were based on the permits-of-stay 
and calculated as share of resident population. Ultimately, our “immigrants” are those 
without host country citizenship: the most marginal group among the foreign born. They 
are also adult, first-generation immigrants: on the other hand, immigration in those 
years was too recent to contain a sizeable second generation. To compare the impact of 
variations in foreign population with that of variations in non-foreign population, we 
considered the number of residents holding Italian citizenship.  
We admit our indicators of immigrant presence could contain some measurement 
errors. Moreover, an omitted variable could affect both the endogenous variable and its 
causal variables. Therefore, a correlation between independent variables and 
disturbance of the endogenous variable cannot be excluded. An instrument would help, 
but a convincing instrument for immigration is hard to find, because many potential IVs 
do not satisfy the exclusion restriction. Eventually, we chose, as instrument, (lagged) 
foreign infants born in Italy. Ethnic groups of immigrants differ in birth rates, but this is 
counterpoised by an advantage of the newborn variable: while official immigration data 
do not compute illegal immigrants, newborn data include also illegal immigrants’ 
newborns. Newborns are recorded by the medical staff and illegal immigrants have an 
interest in having their newborns registered, because newborns’ registration implies 
                                                          
1 The countries of origin of these immigrant groups are Morocco, Albania, Romania, Senegal, former 
Yugoslavia and Tunisia.  
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various benefits, including a temporary residence permit for their parents (Italy: Law 6 
March 1998). Ultimately foreign newborn rates should predict later immigrant share and 
they could be a suitable instrument to check endogeneity. They cannot be directly 
associated with the dependent variables (crime rates), because infants cannot commit 
offences: therefore, any infants-crime relationship must pass through the association of 
infants with the instrumented variable.2 Concurrently, our newborn rates pertain to a 
period preceding that considered for crime rates and immigrant shares: so, successive 
events cannot be the cause of previous events. We would expect (lagged) foreign 
newborn rates first to significantly predict the instrumented variable (inclusion 
restriction), second to impact on crime rates and, third, to be independent of the 
outcome Y given the covariate X, namely later presence of adult immigrants (exclusion 
restriction), which would imply that instrument and error are uncorrelated. The 
endogeneity test of Davidson and MacKinnon (1993: 241-242)3 can provide a precise 
assessment of this point. 
We used other demographic variables as well. Yearly changes of residence (internal 
or from abroad), a measure of residential instability, were introduced to check the social 
disorganization theories. Changes of residence and immigrant share are correlated (r = 
0.65 in the pooled cross-sectional data), but not so as to hinder comparison between 
their effects. The male population aged 15 to 24 years, in turn, could be relevant as a 
                                                          
2 Employing an instrumental variable, only that portion of the variations of  X which can be explained by 
the instrument is used to infer about beta. 
3 This test performs an OLS, FE regression of the original Y on the original X, augmented by the 
residuals obtained from the first-stage regression of X on the instrument, and followed by an F-test for the 
hypothesis that the coefficient of the residuals is zero. Alternatively, regressing Y on X and the 
instrument, an F-test on the instrument coefficient would produce the same results. 
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control for the crime-prone years (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983), since males in this 
age group make a more than proportional contribution to crime. Next, we selected chief 
town population and population per square km to control for urbanization. This control 
is relevant, because immigrants are attracted by large urban centres (OECD 2004; Jayet 
and Ukrayinchuk 2007). The latter in turn are the single best predictor of crime (Dijk, 
Kesteren and Smit 2007), because in urban centres opportunities for victimization 
increase while neighbourhood social control declines. Therefore, urbanization could 
cause spurious correlations between crime and immigration.  
In the domain of economics, we chose per capita GDP as proxy for average 
economic conditions. We assumed that crime, especially property crime, is counter-
related to income (Hale 1998; Arvanites and Defina 2006; Altindag 2012), though a 
higher level of income could boost crime opportunities while reducing crime 
motivations (Cantor and Land 1985, 2001). Besides, it has been known for a long time 
(Robinson 1950) that immigrants are attracted by the more developed areas, and 
therefore GDP represents also an appropriate control. The number of cars was included 
as a further wealth indicator suitable for a nation that – among the sizeably populated 
countries – has the highest rate of passenger cars. Next, two indicators of 
unemployment: unemployed people as a percentage of total labour force, and 
unemployed people aged 15 to 24 years (crime-prone age group) as a percentage of the 
same age labour force. For both these indicators, only males were considered, for their 
greater impact on crime. Unemployment has been used to proxy economic conditions in 
the whole population, both unemployed and employed (Cantor and Land 2001; Phillips 
and Land 2012). However, unemployment implies also loss of a meaningful role in 
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society. Therefore, we expect stronger effects on crime from unemployment than from 
low income (Hooghe et al. 2011) and inequality. Unemployment is the determinant of 
choice in the economic model of crime; and, due to its social by-products, it fits even 
better analyses inspired by the socio-economic deprivation theory. Last, we chose the 
share of people employed by economic sector to measure the impact of type and level of 
development (Reid et al. 2005).  
To these variables, we added infant mortality rate: a variable relating to 
demography but regarded as a measure of actual poverty, net of any welfare benefit 
(Pridemore 2008; Messner, Raffalovich and Sutton 2010). Indeed, this variable seems a 
proxy for wide-ranging deprivation, rather than just poverty, because we found it to be 
associated in Italy with low education and correlated closer with unemployment than 
with GDP.  
A couple of indicators were chosen to gauge the role of social capital in preventing 
crime (Akçomak and Weel 2012): namely, the number of voluntary work associations 
and the copies of the main general interest magazines. Initially, we considered 
newspapers circulation, advocated by Putnam (1993) as a good indicator of social 
capital. However, newspapers proved to be highly correlated with chief town population 
and uncorrelated with voluntary work (which is consistent with high levels of social 
capital) and Mafia-type organizations (consistent with low levels of social capital). 
Eventually, the choice fell on general interest magazines,4 since they proved to be 
uncorrelated with urbanization and instead correlated with the abovementioned other 
                                                          
4 These magazines are Panorama, L’Espresso and Il Mondo. 
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indirect indicators of social capital, as well as with education. These magazines’ 
circulation can be regarded also as an indicator of education and culture.  
Three variables were chosen to measure the dimension of an illegal and/or deviant 
local context that could favour further antisocial behaviour: the rate of people charged 
with “Mafia-type criminal conspiracy”, the rate of people who died from drug abuse and 
that of people charged with drug trafficking offences. Deaths due to drug abuse were 
selected as proxy for hard drugs diffusion. In turn, hard drugs diffusion is considered an 
indicator of anomie and of pressure to commit crimes: violent crime for the control of 
the drug market, and income-generating crime to afford the costs of hard drugs (among 
the massive literature on this subject, Goldstein 1985; Johnson et al. 1991; Bean 2002; 
Ousey and Kubrin 2009). 
Last, we included controls for each of the four waves – to identify and neutralize 
generalized changes in crime rates – as well as controls for peculiar crime trends in the 
main macro-regions, namely the Northern, the Central and the Southern ones.  
Due to their relevance, juvenile male population, chief town population, per capita 
GDP and male unemployment were used in all the full regression models. The wave 
controls were used in all the regression models. The area trend controls whenever their 
contribution was of some relevance. 
Data analysis 
The analysis first focused on pooled data, by means of cross-province linear 
correlations, controlling for time waves, between crime rates and demographic-socio-
economic indicators, to reveal the main forces associated territorially with crime.  
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Next, for reasons presented above, we re-analyzed the same associations in terms of 
variations over time, by means of within-province fixed effects regression models. In 
our models: 
(𝑦𝑝𝑡 − ?̅?𝑝) = 𝛽(𝑥𝑝𝑡 − ?̅?𝑝) + 𝛾(𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑡 − 𝑡?̅?𝑝) + 𝛿(𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡̅̅̅𝑝) + (𝑢𝑝𝑡 − ?̅?𝑝) 
where y is crime in the province p during the year t, x is an independent variable, te is a 
time effect control, at is an area-trend control and u is the (conventional) error term. We 
chose the FE model because: a) the variables of interest registered within-province 
changes over time, b) there are grounds to suspect also powerful time-invariant 
unobserved factors and c) the FE model does not assume that these time-invariant 
factors are uncorrelated with time-varying independent variables (e.g. immigration, 
income, and unemployment), as the RE and GEE models do. Consequently, the FE 
model controls for all the possible time-invariant factors whereas RE and GEE do not.5  
Third, to analyze in depth specific points of theoretical relevance (e.g., differential 
association), we used both variations over time and invariant measures. Due to the 
presence of invariant measures, we opted for within-province first differences OLS 
regression models. 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
                                                          
5 The Hausman’s test was used for the significance of the estimators and the presence of time-invariant 
omitted variables. Possible correlations of the residuals between one wave and the next were checked by 
means of the Pesaran’s and Frees’ tests. These residuals do not represent a serious problem when the 
research units are numerous and the waves only a few. For the pooled data correlations and the FD 
regressions, we used macro-region dummies, substantially equivalent to the FE area-trend controls. 
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Results 
The descriptive statistics show (Table 1) that crime rates are often widely 
differentiated across the territorial units: this advocates a search for explanations. 
Concurrently, the pooled data correlations (Table 2) reveal that the various offences 
differ in their associations with the demographic-socio-economic indicators: thus, 
necessarily, their distribution on the territory is dissimilar. This happens with “violent 
crime”, such as homicides, rapes, grievous bodily harm and robberies. The same 
happens with “property crime”: thefts and extortions are uncorrelated. Therefore, these 
results reveal that using, as regressands, aggregative crime categories such as “violent 
crime” and “property crime” – which is common practice in this type of studies – can be 
misleading when trying to identify crime determinants. 
We notice also that several offences registered sizeable changes over time.6 Rapes 
and grievous bodily harm registered increases; whereas thefts registered a decrease (see 
Table 2, Time). These changes were general, i.e. they concerned all or most of the 
territorial units. Changes due to “shock periods” call for controls for the various waves: 
we discovered that otherwise the outcomes of both the pooled and the longitudinal data 
would be different and ultimately unreliable. 
Moreover, crime trends over time presented some differences in the main macro-
regions. For example, the homicide trends were negative in the Northern and Central 
macro-regions and positive for the Southern one. Therefore, for some regression 
models, the controls based on macro-region time trends can prevent spurious results. 
                                                          
6 The Chow’s test confirmed that the time dummies are jointly significant for the rates of most offences. 
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That said, we notice (Table 2) that homicide rates are associated territorially with 
male unemployment (by far the closest association), 15 to 24-year-old male population, 
infant mortality, Mafia-type organizations and “South”; whereas they are inversely 
associated with GDP, cars, people employed in the industry sector, social capital and 
culture, residential instability and immigration indicators. Instead, there is no 
association between homicides, urbanization, and drug diffusion. So homicide is rife 
where there is unemployment, underdevelopment, limited social capital, residential 
stability, and larger juvenile age groups, as is the case in a pre-modern population 
profile. In such a context, foreign immigration is low, because immigrants are attracted 
by the richer, more developed and usually more urbanized areas.  
The territorial distribution of extortions resembles that of homicides. Behind 
extortions, we find the same background of socio-economic underdevelopment, again 
with unemployment as the closest correlate, and an inverse association with residential 
instability and immigration, whereas the correlation with “South” is particularly high. 
Table 2 about here 
Robberies, in turn, are correlated with some indicators of social malaise 
characterizing the previous offences. However, robberies are mainly marked by their 
close association with urbanization. There is also an association with drug diffusion and 
“South”, but no association with immigration. From all this, we can infer that robberies 
are more common in less-developed urban areas, which are not particularly attractive to 
foreign immigrants.  
Rapes, as noticed, show a territorial distribution dissimilar from that of other 
“violent crimes”, such as homicides and robberies. Rapes are correlated with foreign 
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immigration and, in addition, with urbanization (the closest correlate), income, the 
services sector, magazine circulation, and with drug trafficking as well. Overall, rapes 
are associated with a context of material wellbeing, attracting immigrants, where also 
deviant behaviour (drug trafficking) is rife. When we introduce the main controls, 
however, immigration loses its significance. 
A further type of violent crime, namely grievous bodily harm, shows an association 
with the services sector and drug trafficking, but no association with foreign 
immigration. 
The most common offence against property, theft, is territorially associated with 
urbanization (the closest correlate), then with income, cars, culture, drug trafficking, 
drug diffusion, and foreign immigration. Theft shows also some association with 
residential instability. The theft-unemployment correlation on the other hand is 
negative. This is partly due to the underlying link between income and unemployment (r 
= –0.80): if we regress thefts on unemployment controlling for income, unemployment 
becomes positively associated with thefts and both income and unemployment are 
significant. Concurrently, immigrants prefer to settle in high-income provinces, as 
shown by the correlation between immigration and GDP (r = 0.76) and confirmed by 
the association between lagged GDP and variations in immigration over the period 
1995-2005 (r = 0.78). And immigration is inversely correlated with unemployment as 
well (in the pooled data, r = −0.53). Therefore, even the association between 
immigration and theft should be treated with caution. Indeed, controlling for 
unemployment and GDP, the immigration-theft relationship becomes weak. 
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Last, overall crime is associated with urbanization (again, the closest correlate), the 
services sector, culture and both drug diffusion and drug trafficking. Its correlation with 
immigration, too, is positive: however, as for theft, controlling for GDP and 
unemployment, the association between overall crime and immigration becomes weak. 
Moving from the pooled data to the fixed effects analysis, we encounter a different 
scenario, as suggested by the significance of the fixed effects (in all but one of the 14 
models, the hypothesis that the fixed effect intercepts are zero is rejected: Table 3, F-
test). First, we notice that – contrary to the pooled data results – variations in foreign 
immigrants are statistically significant for all the offences considered. This occurs in 
both the FE models: the basic and the full regression model (Table 3). The effect of 
immigration is robust in all the cases, but for the extortion basic model. For robbery, 
rape, grievous bodily harm, theft and overall crime, immigration is the strongest 
predictor in the full models; for homicide and extortion, it is the second best. For each 
percentage change in male immigrants, the percentage change7 in homicides is 0.28 and 
in rapes 0.15 (basic models); for each percentage change in high-crime national groups, 
the percentage change in grievous bodily harm is 0.23, in thefts 0.12, in robberies 0.25, 
and in overall crime is 0.11. The effect size of male immigrants is slightly higher than 
that of male and female immigrants, but similar in most cases to that of the high-crime 
national groups (males). The latter indicator, however, is particularly relevant in the 
case of thefts and overall crime, where the share of male and female immigrants plays 
the role of control variable. Instead, variations in non-foreign population – both as 
                                                          
7 Elasticity was calculated as average value of dy/dx * (x/y). 
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single regressor or in the full models – are never significant, for any offence. To check 
endogeneity, we ran two-stage FE models, using (lagged) foreign newborns as 
instrument. Foreign newborns are a strong instrument (Table 3, first stage: F-test P is 
0.000, t-value for the instrument more than 11). They significantly predict overall crime, 
homicides, rapes and robberies. Concurrently, if we regress crime on both foreign 
newborns and the instrumented variable, newborns’ impact on crime evaporates (t-value 
−0.55, P-value 0.585 in the case of overall crime) while that of the instrumented variable 
is momentous (t-value 4.07, P-value 0.000: full results available on request). For all the 
offences, Davidson and MacKinnon’s endogeneity test statistics are non-significant: 
therefore, we cannot reject the null of exogeneity and we can continue to treat our 
foreign immigrant indicators (adult immigrants and high-crime national groups) as 
exogenous. 
Regarding other indicators, we notice that – as in the pooled data – the contribution 
of Mafia-type organizations is robust for homicide and extortion. Infant mortality, too, 
is still relevant for homicide. Drug trafficking plays some role only for rape. The role of 
chief town population is modest, while the significance of social capital and culture 
indicators vanishes.  
Table 3 about here 
Table 3 (continued) about here 
As mentioned earlier, changes in immigration are associated with changes in 
residential instability, while lagged immigration predicts instability variations (t-value = 
5.4). However, lagged instability does not predict immigration variations: immigrants 
are not attracted by high instability provinces. For any offence, residential instability by 
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itself exhibits a null or inverse relationship with crime variations, no matter the model: 
e.g., as single regressor of overall crime variations, its t-value is −0.06 (model not 
shown). 
Regarding the economic indicators, we notice that GDP variations contribute to 
theft variations only. Changes in unemployment, in turn, are never significant, no matter 
the model, even when controlling for GDP: e.g., for overall crime, unemployment t-
value = 1.12 (model not shown). Immigration variables eclipse the role that GDP and 
unemployment had as predictors of thefts in the pooled data analysis.  
The unemployment variable was scrutinized also to test the hypothesis of indirect 
effects of immigration on crime. To do this, we calculated the immigration impact on 
male and youth male unemployment. However, we know that immigrants prefer to 
settle where economic-vocational conditions are better. Besides, foreign immigrant 
inflows could generate native internal migration. All this could blur the immigration-
unemployment link: therefore, we used controls for these aspects. The analysis was 
conducted for the entire period 1995-2005 and for the various waves as well. The results 
were convergent: conditional on baseline unemployment and other controls, 
immigration variations have no significant impact on unemployment; in particular, no 
impact on the unemployment of the critical 15 to 24 years age group (Table 4, Models 
1). Moreover, we found no evidence of an inverse association between immigrant 
inflows and variations in non-foreign population, no matter the model (see also Table 4, 
Model 3-4). This contradicts the hypothesis of native internal migration as a 
consequence of foreign immigration. Regarding the immigration impact on income, we 
conducted a similar analysis. We found that immigrant inflows do not impact negatively 
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on per capita GDP (Table 4, Model 2). In the last analysis, these results do not support 
the hypothesis of an indirect impact of immigration on crime. 
Table 4 about here 
Next, we tested the hypothesis that immigrant crime has been the offshoot of 
previous native crime. Our data showed that foreign immigration was attracted by 
wealth, lower unemployment and urbanization. Such factors being equal, immigrant 
variations over the entire period 1995-2005 were inversely associated with previous 
crime rates (Table 4, Model 3-4, showing the cases of overall crime and grievous bodily 
harm). Therefore, immigrant population grew particularly where crime rate was 
originally lower. Moreover, the first differences analysis revealed that crime variations 
were negatively associated with previous crime level (Table 4, Models 5-6-7, showing 
thefts, robberies and overall crime; the results for homicides, rapes and bodily harm are 
equivalent).8 If immigrant crime were the offshoot of previous native crime, we would 
expect some crime intensification in high-crime territorial units, and only in the long 
term. Instead, crime growth followed immigrant inflows without delay (Table 3 FE 
models: the temporal gap between the panel waves is 3.3 years) and such a growth was 
higher where crime had been lower. Consequently, crime distribution changed as 
immigration soared and the immigrants’ territorial distribution became more 
homogeneous. From 1995 to 2005, the standard deviation to the mean of the immigrant 
share in all the provinces decreased from 70 to 57: concurrently, overall crime standard 
                                                          
8 In this analysis, we used ∆2 (dep. var.) t+3 in lieu of ∆3 (dep. var.) t+3, because otherwise the baseline 
values of the dependent variable would be on both sides of the equation, inflating the errors. 
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deviation decreased from 41 to 35. Homicides, rapes, robberies, extortions and grievous 
bodily harm exhibited the same downward trend in standard deviation. 
Discussion 
A first result of the present study is the alternative scenario brought to light by the 
longitudinal analysis. When the analysis focused on pooled cross-sectional data, only 
two offences – rape and theft (plus overall crime) – showed a clear positive association 
with foreign immigration; two more offences – grievous bodily harm and robbery – had 
no association; what is more, the remaining offences – homicide and extortion – showed 
patent inverse associations with immigration. When the analysis focused on cross-
sectional time-series data, the scenario dramatically changed: all the offences emerged 
as associated with immigration, and both in the basic and in the full regression models, 
while the instrumental variable confirmed the exogeneity of the immigration indicators. 
The immigration-crime association is particularly robust for homicide, robbery, theft, 
grievous bodily harm, rape and overall crime. The results obtained using the “male 
foreign immigrants” variable were in most cases like those obtained with “high-crime 
national groups (males)”: and this supports the FE results reliability. Instead, variations 
in non-foreign population were never significant in predicting offences. The latter 
results indirectly emphasize the relevance of the immigration factor in itself.  
In the light of the longitudinal findings, the cross-sectional data results should be 
reconsidered. The rates of some crimes – first homicides and extortions, then robberies 
– are affected by time-invariant factors belonging to a background of unemployment, 
underdevelopment, Mafia-type organizations and limited social capital. This 
background, characterizing the Southern region, is unsurprisingly associated with low 
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population mobility and limited foreign immigration. In turn, the theft rate is affected by 
a second relatively stable setting – characterized by development and wealth – which 
entices immigrants. Ultimately, the difference between the results obtained from the 
cross-sectional data and those from the cross-sectional time-series data suggests that the 
outcomes of studies based on synchronic analyses, the standard approach till now, can 
be misleading.  
Further considerations can be drawn from unemployment, a variable deemed 
momentous for crime prediction. The cross-sectional analysis has shown that male 
unemployment is closely correlated with homicides, extortions and, at a lower degree, 
with robberies, but it is not correlated with thefts, the very offence one would expect to 
be most associated with unfavourable economic conditions. Instead, thefts are correlated 
with GDP: therefore, a higher GDP does not seem to curtail the interest in stealing by 
increasing affluence and, indirectly, legitimate opportunities (supply); on the contrary, it 
seems to encourage theft by making more goods available to thieves. For the crucial 
offence against property, i.e. theft, unemployment seems to play a subordinate role by 
comparison with the presence of goods. Still, controlling for income, cross-sectional 
unemployment differences predict thefts. 
Unemployment variations over time, however, do not predict crime variations, not 
even in the case of thefts. Concurrently, decreases in GDP do not result in more crime. 
This is at odds with both the economic model of crime and the anomic strain or relative 
deprivation approach. One could maintain that these theories are indirectly confirmed, 
though unemployment in itself is non-significant, because variations in foreign 
immigrants – who are on average in worse economic conditions than natives – are 
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associated with crime. The fact that the previously mentioned six national groups from 
non-Western, less-developed countries, are particularly significant in predicting thefts 
could be another indicator pointing in the same direction: the status of these groups is 
indeed on average lower than that of other immigrants. However, one would have to 
admit that even so the crime determinant would not be a generic “lower economic 
status” but rather immigrants’ specific deprivation.  
To piece together this puzzle, we should consider that structural unemployment 
effects are far removed from frictional unemployment ones. In Southern Italy, there are 
provinces characterized by age-old structural unemployment – almost four times the 
national average – and male youth unemployment affecting two-thirds of the pertinent 
population (Table 1). The Italian welfare state is rather generous toward frictional 
unemployment, but powerless against such structural unemployment. Moreover, people 
in frictional unemployment can usually rely on their (or their family’s) savings, whereas 
people in structural unemployment cannot do so. Understandably, high rates of 
structural unemployment are associated with high rates of crime, firstly professional 
crime like extortion; whereas temporary increases in unemployment – alleviated by 
savings and unemployment benefits – do not significantly affect crime. This tallies with 
the unemployment impact upon crime when dealing with stock data and its non-
significant effect when dealing with flow data; it tallies also with GDP decreases over 
time that do not result in more crime. In the case of immigrants, their relative economic 
deprivation is hardly cushioned by savings and in particular illegal immigrants cannot 
rely on welfare benefits. Overall, the immigrant condition bears some similarity with 
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that of structurally unemployed people, and the immigrant inflow has been closely 
followed by increases in crime.  
This scenario would suggest a link between immigrant economic deprivation and 
property crime. Indeed, previous longitudinal studies found a link between immigration 
and only property crimes, or no link at all. The present study results endorse a link 
concerning violent crimes as well as property crimes. The immigration elasticity of 
robbery is high: but so is that of grievous bodily harm. The immigration elasticity of 
rape – an offence at the opposite pole from utilitarian crime – is higher than that of theft. 
From these results, it is possible to draw some theoretical conclusions. This compound 
criminal scenario is hardly attributable only to the immigrants’ recourse to illegitimate 
opportunities. It suggests, on the contrary, a multifaceted explanatory framework, where 
immigrant lower economic options are accompanied by alienation, frustration and 
problematic social interaction. This does not fit in with the economic model of crime 
but is compatible with the anomic strain theory. 
The present analysis allowed us to check also the indirect effects of immigration on 
native crime, which could be caused – as stated previously – by an increase in natives’ 
unemployment and a decrease in their income. We found no evidence of any increase in 
unemployment and decrease in income after the massive growth of foreign population. 
The reason for these results could be that the immigration impact on native 
unemployment and income is more likely to be sizeable where the labour market is open 
and immigrant labour competitive. This impact is probably limited where the labour 
market is segmented and immigrants non-competitive, also due to their low skills, as 
seems to be the case in Italy. The present analysis shows that, whereas increases in 
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immigration are good crime predictors, the hypothesis of indirect effects of immigration 
on crime remains unsubstantiated. The alternative hypothesis of direct effects emerges 
fortified by these results. 
The panel analysis has been useful to check also other theoretical paradigms. 
Residential instability embraces changes of residence of both national and foreign 
population. Consequently, one could hypothesize that residential instability is a good 
crime predictor. However, variations in residential instability do not predict crime 
variations; nor do they magnify the immigration effect on crime in the full regression 
models. Therefore, the present results do not support social disorganization theory, 
insofar as the latter emphasizes the relevance of residential instability as a crime 
determinant: any increase in foreign population implies also an increase in the 
residential instability figures, but only foreign population variations are significant. 
The present findings are also at odds with the differential association hypothesis. 
There was already evidence that immigrant crime rates in Europe were higher than 
native rates. This was of itself discordant with the abovementioned hypothesis, which 
was developed in the U.S. when immigrant crime rates were on average lower than 
native ones but higher among second-generation immigrants. Our data concern the first 
generation only, but the possibility that first-generation immigrants replicated and 
further expanded native crime cannot be ruled out. However, this hypothesis is 
implausible, for a combination of reasons: because the immigrant inflow was lesser 
where crime rate was higher; because crime rapidly grew where immigrant population 
increased; and consequently, crime rates rose where they had been lower. An 
unsuspected development associated with foreign immigration has been the more even 
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distribution of crime rates over the national territory. The immigration-crime link did 
not entail a generalized rise in crime but, specifically, a territorial increase in crime 
concomitant with immigration. 
Conclusions 
This study – the first territorial panel analysis in Europe testing the main theoretical 
hypotheses on the immigration-crime association – found that this association, hardly 
detectable in the cross-sectional analysis, becomes manifest in the cross-sectional time-
series one. The rise in foreign immigrants resulted in positive variations in common 
crime but also in serious crime; in offences with limited or zero underreporting 
(robbery, intentional homicide), as well as in offences underrated because underreported 
when committed within ethnic groups (theft, bodily harm). Moreover, contrary to 
expectations derived from previous literature, the immigration-crime association is not 
restricted to property crimes. In turn, phenomena usually regarded as crime 
determinants, i.e. unemployment and income, have emerged as poor predictors of crime 
as compared to immigration. 
This study did not find just an association between immigration and crime. It found 
that this association seems direct, rather than indirect via an increase in native crime, 
because immigration did not affect natives’ unemployment and income. Besides, it 
found that this association seems to derive from immigration in itself and not from 
residential instability. It found also that – contrary to differential association theory and 
despite the long presence of Mafia-type criminal organizations – crime associated with 
immigration is not the offshoot of past crime. The immigrants considered here were 
foreign citizens, the most recently arrived and marginal share of the foreign born. This 
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could explain the present findings and these immigrants’ impact on crime: their impact 
is reminiscent of that of structural socio-economic deprivation. The whole picture of the 
Italian critical case – characterized by rampant rise in immigration, exotic origin of 
most immigrants and limited opportunities for them, due to scant economic freedom – 
contrasts with the situation of Western European countries in the 1950s-1960s, when 
most immigrants came from Western Europe itself, pull factors prevailed, 
manufacturing jobs were plentiful, illegal immigrants rare, and immigrant crime low. 
The Italian case stands in clear contradiction also to that of the U.S., Canada, and 
Australia, where the immigration impact on crime has remained statistically non-
significant or negative. In particular, the Italian case challenges the possibility of 
generalizing the U.S. immigrant paradox, i.e. low crime in the first-generation 
immigrant population despite its relative socio-economic disadvantage. 
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Table 1. Longitudinal data summary statistics. All the Italian provinces; four waves: 1995-1998-
2002-2005; Observations (N · T) = 412 
Variables by domain 
 Overall    Within  
Mean Std. dev. Min Max  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Crime         
Intentional homicide 2.4 2.5 0.00 16.4  1.3 −3.4 10.6 
Rape 6.1 3.1 0.00 15.9  2.4 −1.1 13.2 
Grievous bodily harm 93.5 48.6 9.5 358.0  33.8 −51.0 262.1 
Theft 2,251.3 1,209.3 234.9 7,820.1  757.3 −909.6 6,060.6 
Robbery 51.1 52.7 6.1 491.6  18.2 −89.4 172.7 
Extortion 13.5 11.4 0.2 91.9  5.0 −8.2 52.9 
Overall crime 4,300.8 1,612.4 1,073.2 12,636.5  996.9 722.4 9,514.2 
Population         
Adult foreign immigrants (MF) % 2.1 1.6 0.2 9.6  1.2 −1.4 7.0 
Adult foreign immigrants (M) % 1.1 0.9 0.1 5.4  0.6 −1.2 4.0 
High-crime nat. groups imm. (M) % 0.6 0.5 0.01 3.0  0.3 −0.1 1.7 
(Foreign newborns per 1K pop.) year −1 0.4 0.4 0.005 2.6  0.3 −0.6 1.6  
Ln (Non-foreign population) 12.9 0.7 11.4 15.1  0.01 12.9 13.0 
Residential instability per 100 pop. 2.4 0.8 1.0 4.3  0.3 1.5 3.4 
Male pop. aged 15 to 24 years % 6.0 1.2 3.6 9.2  0.7 4.8 7.6 
Population per square km 81.4 89.3 13.1 562.1  1.9 74.6 96.1 
Ln (Chief town population) 11.5 0.9 10.0 14.8  0.02 11.4 11.6 
Infant mortality per 1K pop. 4.8 1.7 1.8 11.9  1.2 2.0 8.2 
Economics         
GDP per capita (,000) 17.48 5.03 7.02 33.74  2.63 11.84 24.06 
Passenger cars per 100 pop. 56.7 8.0 36.2 111.0  3.8 35.2 72.2 
Employed, agriculture sector % 7.0 5.2 0.3 25.2  1.4 0.3 12.4 
Employed, industry sector % 29.9 9.5 12.5 53.7  1.5 23.9 34.4 
Employed, services sector % 63.1 8.1 45.3 86.7  2.0 56.8 69.6 
Unemployed, m. 15-24 yr old % 23.3 16.2 1.2 68.1  6.1 4.5 40.0 
Unemployed, m. >=15 yr old % 7.3 5.8 0.4 27.1  2.0 −1.3 13.6 
Social capital & culture         
General interest magazines per 1K pop. 16.5 5.4 6.4 29.1  1.3 12.4 20.8 
Voluntary work associations per 10K pop. 3.2 2.8 0.01 28.8  1.3 −10.8 10.7 
Illegal & deviant context         
Ln (Mafia-type organizations) 0.4 1.1 0.00 10.7  0.6 −3.6 5.5 
Deaths due to drug abuse per 100K pop. 1.3 1.2 0.00 11.9  0.9 −2.8 8.8 
Drug trafficking 49.6 33.8 1.8 266.5  15.4 −26.4 111.8 
NB: All the offences were calculated as yearly rates per 100K population.  
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Table 2. Pooled data of the four waves 1995-1998-2002-2005 for all the provinces. Partial 
correlation coefficients between the offences and the independent/control variables, controlling 
for the time variables; Observations (N · T) = 412 
Variables by domain 
Intent. 
homicide Rape 
Griev. bd. 
harm Theft Robbery Extortion 
Overall 
crime 
Crime        
Intentional homicide 1.000 0.126 0.088 −0.020 0.280 0.588 0.141 
Rape 0.126 1.000 0.178 0.223 0.157 0.143 0.289 
Grievous bodily harm 0.088 0.178 1.000 0.133 0.001 0.069 0.398 
Theft −0.020 0.223 0.133 1.000 0.433 −0.044 0.903 
Robbery 0.280 0.157 0.001 0.433 1.000 0.268 0.439 
Extortion 0.588 0.143 0.069 −0.044 0.268 1.000 0.098 
Overall crime 0.141 0.289 0.398 0.903 0.439 0.098 1.000 
Population        
Adult foreign immigrants (MF) −0.261 0.191 −0.072 0.282 0.038 −0.397 0.190 
Adult foreign immigrants (M) −0.233 0.172 −0.106 0.235 0.014 −0.389 0.141 
High-crime nat. groups imm. (M) −0.221 0.072 0.023 0.107 −0.124 −0.364 0.041 
(Foreign newborns) year −1 −0.277 0.066 −0.182 0.192 −0.007 −0.365 0.053 
Ln (Non-foreign population) 0.035 0.125 −0.199 0.389 0.638 0.131 0.302 
Residential instability −0.297 −0.005 −0.111 0.217 −0.009 −0.474 0.084 
Male pop. aged 15 to 24 years 0.435 −0.123 −0.083 −0.225 0.247 0.588 −0.138 
Population per square km 0.045 0.189 −0.070 0.452 0.698 0.067 0.439 
Ln (Chief town population) 0.052 0.284 −0.066 0.561 0.664 0.094 0.492 
Infant mortality 0.437 −0.030 0.000 −0.094 0.229 0.543 −0.030 
Economics        
GDP per capita −0.459 0.152 −0.116 0.316 −0.096 −0.577 0.159 
Passenger cars −0.325 −0.020 −0.014 0.209 −0.067 −0.424 0.116 
Employed, agriculture sector 0.389 −0.075 0.018 −0.349 −0.134 0.502 −0.242 
Employed, industry sector −0.453 −0.131 −0.205 −0.073 −0.239 −0.437 −0.226 
Employed, services sector 0.288 0.204 0.231 0.309 0.369 0.196 0.422 
Employed per population −0.496 0.137 −0.124 0.263 −0.138 −0.561 0.102 
Unemployed, m. 15-24 yr old 0.602 0.047 0.140 −0.057 0.362 0.622 0.107 
Unemployed, m. >=15 yr old 0.614 0.026 0.053 −0.100 0.376 0.624 0.033 
Social capital & culture       
General interest magazines  −0.404 0.158 0.024 0.305 −0.171 −0.566 0.221 
Voluntary work associations  −0.234 0.084 −0.097 0.017 −0.252 −0.392 −0.087 
Illegal & deviant context       
Ln (Mafia-type organizations) 0.565 0.012 0.044 −0.067 0.200 0.528 0.031 
Deaths due to drug abuse −0.070 0.040 0.137 0.306 0.124 −0.165 0.279 
Drug trafficking −0.031 0.167 0.143 0.308 0.167 −0.060 0.309 
Territory        
Northern provinces −0.270 0.033 −0.055 0.137 −0.106 −0.427 0.029 
Central provinces −0.221 −0.004 0.002 0.107 −0.100 −0.209 0.094 
Southern provinces 0.468 −0.032 0.055 −0.233 0.195 0.623 −0.110 
Time        
T −0.051 −0.557 −0.224 0.083 −0.062 −0.043 −0.037 
t+1 0.075 0.110 −0.123 0.182 0.099 0.054 0.150 
t+2 0.032 0.223 0.159 −0.100 0.002 0.008 −0.056 
t+3 −0.056 0.224 0.187 −0.165 −0.039 −0.019 −0.057 
NB: Coefficients >=0.178, p. <0.001; coeffs >=0.131, p. <0.01; coeffs >= 0.097, p. <0.05  
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Table 3. Within-province fixed effects multiple regression models for main criminal offences and various independent/control variables. Four waves: 1995-
1998-2002-2005. Coefficients and standard errors 
Variables 
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b 
Intent. homicide Intent. homicide Extortion Extortion Robbery Robbery Rape Rape 
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
t+1 0.34 0.21 −0.27 0.49 1.24 0.95 1.18 1.55 12.50 2.73 8.05 5.09 3.27 0.29 2.05 0.51 
t+2 −0.10 0.24 −1.06 0.95 −0.91 1.54 −2.02 2.91 −1.37 3.06 −10.7 10.2 3.55 0.33 0.18 1.03 
t+3 −0.89 0.32 −1.79 1.26 −3.01 2.29 −4.26 3.66 −12.80 4.04 −23.8 12.6 3.03 0.44 −1.34 1.28 
Northern prov. area-trend   −0.112 0.051 0.024 0.196           
Southern prov. area-trend   −0.054 0.066 0.28 0.24           
Adult foreign immigrants (M) 0.68 0.19 0.90 0.30         0.85 0.26 1.24 0.41 
High-crime nat. groups imm. (M)     3.62 1.78 5.19 1.84 22.47 4.56 18.61 5.88     
Ln (Non-foreign population)   −14.21 6.51             
Residential instability   −0.37 0.54   −2.61 1.91       −1.64 0.72 
Male pop. aged 15 to 24 years   −1.18 0.50   −0.35 1.85   −6.36 6.52   −1.39 0.67 
Ln (Chief town population)   0.31 4.08   7.60 14.63   34.2 52.2   7.96 5.32 
Infant mortality   0.40 0.10             
GDP per capita   0.021 0.121   0.13 0.45   0.30 1.55   0.29 0.16 
Employed, industry sector           −0.38 0.74     
Unemployed, males >=15 yr old   0.027 0.047   −0.21 0.18   0.35 0.67   −0.142 0.065 
General interest magazines    −0.055 0.072   −0.28 0.28         
Voluntary work associations                  
Ln (Mafia-type organizations)   1.28 0.33   7.53 1.28   3.11 4.63     
Drug trafficking   0.0076 0.0049           0.0117 0.0067 
Constant (ave. value of FE) 1.86 0.17 326 111 −208 301 −65.0 166.4 37.43 2.50 −306 596 2.75 0.24 −79.0 60.4 
F-test (prob.) 0.000 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (within) 0.072 0.211 0.034 0.156 0.162 0.169 0.514 0.544 
Observations (N · T)     412     412     412   412     412     412     412 412 
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Table 3. Continued 
Variables 
Model 5a Model 5b Model 6a Model 6b Model 7a Model 7b Model 8 
Grievous bd. harm Grievous bd. harm Theft Theft Overall crime Overall crime 
Overall crime: High-crime nat. groups 
imm. (M) = Foreign newborns 
(1st stage)               (2nd stage) 
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
t+1 2.63 5.74 −9.59 11.98 97.4 134.4 544 225 202 182 775 352 0.086 0.025 248 200 
t+2 14.49 9.34 −24.6 26.9 −705 219 55.9 416.5 −949 296 110 737 0.217 0.041 −816 383 
t+3 0.22 13.89 −52.0 35.4 −1,126 324 −17.9 525.7 −1,658 439 −210 977 0.423 0.059 −1,411 630 
Northern provinces area-trend −1.43 1.19 −0.54 1.30 −4.80 27.83   14.7 37.7 38.5 38.5 −0.0083 0.0054 16.2 37.8 
Southern provinces area-trend 3.34 1.46 2.69 1.73 45.3 34.2   146.5 46.3 81.6 53.1 −0.033 0.006 126.5 59.1 
Adult foreign immigrants (MF)       −536 148   −532 202     
High-crime nat. groups imm. (M) 43.9 10.8 37.8 12.3 715 252 1,748 388 1,553 342 2,589 531   1,275 612 
(Foreign newborns) year −1              0.619 0.053   
Ln (Non-foreign population)           −6,476 5,091 
    
Residential instability       −122 300   −287 426 
    
Male pop. aged 15 to 24 years   −3.77 12.79   594 269   740 391     
Ln (Chief town population)   115.1 93.9   2,900 2,185   6,531 3,234 
    
Infant mortality   −3.02 2.49             
GDP per capita   0.91 3.02   148.5 67.1   124.8 96.0 
    
Passenger cars   2.06 1.06         
    
Employed, services sector   2.95 1.27         
    
Unemployed, males 15-24 yr old       13.0 10.7   25.1 14.8 
    
Unemployed, males >=15 yr old   −1.54 1.19   −24.1 36.1   −61.8 50.8     
General interest magazines        29.3 41.5     
    
Drug trafficking   0.053 0.122         
    
Constant (ave. value of FE) −998 1,820 −2,905 2,238 −22,338 42,598 −37,528 24,944 −111,613 57,679 −85,336 85,899 30.66 7.84 −98,862 62,276 
F-test (prob.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (within)  0.241 0.276  0.169  0.234  0.122  0.185  0.843  0.120 
Observations (N · T)     412    412     412     412       412       412       412       412 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of 
endogeneity (H0: var. is exog.):       0.299 Prob. = 0.585 
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Table 4. Within-province first differences multiple regression models (OLS) for criminal offences and other variables. Four waves: 1995-1998-2002-2005. 
Coefficients and standard errors 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
(Unemployed, m. 
15-24 yr old) t+3 
(GDP per capita) 
t+3 
∆3 (Adult foreign
imm. MF) t+3 
∆3 (Adult foreign
imm. MF) t+3 
∆2 (Theft) 
t+3 
∆2 (Robbery)
t+3 
∆2 (Overall crime)
t+3 
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Northern provinces 1.54 2.02 −0.30 0.35 −0.26 0.30 −0.43 0.30 −304 317 2.15 6.77 −68.7 411.1 
Southern provinces 4.07 2.71 −0.96 0.48 −1.02 0.44 −1.23 0.44 −190 405 −6.59 8.84 −492 526 
∆3 (Adult foreign imm. MF) t+3 0.066 0.672 0.19 0.11 
∆3 (ln (Non-foreign population)) t+3 −29.5 22.7 −9.07 3.86 3.88 3.97 6.00 3.81 
(Male pop. aged 15 to 24 yrs) t −0.21 0.21 −0.16 0.20 
∆3 (Male pop. aged 15 to 24 yrs) t+3 1.59 1.87 −0.57 0.32 433 357 1.38 7.45 651 451 
(ln (Chief town population)) t 2.02 0.92 0.58 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.29 0.14 
∆3 (ln (Chief town population)) t+3 431 2,514 −81.8 54.6 1,365 3,295 
(GDP per capita) t −1.55 0.49 1.123 0.087 0.170 0.075 0.205 0.075 
∆3 (GDP per capita) t+3 148.3 94.3 3.39 2.03 110 122 
(Unemployed, m. 15-24 yr old) t 0.254 0.075 
(Unemployed, m. >=15 yr old) t −0.044 0.038 −0.023 0.035 −0.0035 0.035 
∆3 (Unemployed, m. >=15 yr old) t+3 12.9 44.5 −0.32 0.98 −24.4 57.8 
(Grievous bodily harm) t −0.0051 0.0018 
(Theft) t −0.25 0.11 
(Robbery) t −0.444 0.053 
(Overall crime) t −0.000201 0.000069 −0.225 0.097 
Constant 11.89 8.91 −2.50 1.53 1.53 1.85 −1.00 1.89 −99.7 833.9 −10.7 18.1 934 1,090 
R-squared   0.781 0.959 0.688 0.689 0.117 0.511 0.110 
Observations (N)   103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
